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Abstract: As emerging encryption technology results in widespread freedom from detection 
of online activity, Homo Virtualis might usefully be considered as Homo sapiens without a 
gun to its head—a highly evolved species experiencing, for the first time on a massive scale, 
a home environment in which the individual who engages in acts that harm others is not 
identifiable. This renders the punishment of antisocial behavior in this context impossible, 
clearing the warning signals for retribution and crippling this ancient and brutal method for 
limiting the occurrence of antisocial or unwanted behavior. If Homo Virtualis is to retain this 
newfound freedom from threat and invigilation, prosocial behavior must continue to prevail 
in the absence of credible threat of punishment for the antisocial. The prospects are far 
from certain, and an attendant spike in the frequency of misdeed would be sure to evoke a 
crackdown on encryption tech. On the bright side, a widespread failure of punishment to 
inhibit malice and malfeasance online might finally evoke serious consideration of how H. 
sapiens might ensure a low frequency of antisocial behavior absent the threat of dire conse-
quence for transgression, via the positive reinforcement of prosocial conduct, rendering in-
terpersonal and community sensitivity and service pleasurable rather than obligatory. En-
cryption technologies can provide valuable support for such a comprehensively humanistic 
effort to reduce malfeasance by eliminating threats of public censure for current and bud-
ding offenders’ own efforts to address their problematic proclivities. 
Keywords: social control of behavior, social punishment, encryption technology, surveillance 
technology, behavioral engineering 
 
Homo sapien’s tradition of aversive social control of undesirable behavior  
In common with the members of many other species, throughout recorded history human 
beings have arranged a regimen of threat, surveillance, and inflicted pain of reduced cir-
cumstances as a means of reducing the probability that their conspecifics will act in ways 
that harm themselves and others and conflict with the interests of the community. This is 
the model of social control of individual conduct that we humans employ when we threat-
en, say, confinement for a given period as a penalty for engaging in a certain activity, then 
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collect observations that, if judged to reliably indicate that the person is or has behaved in 
this manner, compel us to restrict her or his wellbeing in accordance with prevailing law or 
community practice.  
This ancient and brutal method of reducing the probability of occurrence of undesirable be-
havior in others is commonly employed in our savage markets and labor relations, in our 
cutthroat educational systems, in apocalyptic religious and ethical training and in our every-
day disagreements with neighbors, friends and family members. Even infatuated lovers may 
be found to censure their sweethearts’ inattention by petulant threats of withdrawal of af-
fection. The principal difference between the method of control of undesirable behavior in 
our explicitly codified legal systems and in our tolerably menacing interpersonal control 
practices would appear to be the intensity of displeasure experienced by both the aggrieved 
and the reproved parties; indeed, it is typically when interpersonal threat and censure fail to 
control undesirable behavior in others that we turn to a legal system publically authorized 
to intervene with more powerful threats of aversive consequences for unsanctioned activi-
ty.  
Limiting social misconduct by the tripartite method of threat, surveillance and punishment 
of noncompliance is costly even for those who scrupulously obey the rules, for the innocent 
must also submit to public scrutiny of activity and suffer the same perpetual threat of dire 
consequences for transgressions that have not yet committed—but still might. Nobody 
wants to be cautioned, monitored, nor least of all transitioned to a lesser state of wellbeing, 
but in order to limit the malfeasance and cruelty of others, antediluvian social convention 
demands that we each in turn expose ourselves to public inspection and possible censure 
for actions observed or implied. 
If the threat is sufficiently potent, aversive social control often does produce high levels of 
self-vigilance for the warning signals from the inchoate occurrence of unethical, inept, inapt, 
or otherwise punishable actions and thoughts, resulting in precise if inflexible adherence to 
explicit or implied rules of acceptable social and intrapersonal conduct. The universally pop-
ular use of social punishment is based in the commonplace effectiveness of making others 
afraid or miserable until they do what they are told. But the control of behavior by contin-
gent relief from threat of transition to a lesser state is distressing for both parties, even 
when it works as planned. And when effective, high levels of watchfulness for potential er-
rors and unintended desecrations in one’s own thoughts and deeds can readily displace es-
sential activities such as experimentation and rational risk-taking; behavioral conditions 
such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder and paranoid ideation may be mani-
festations of generalized vigilance for potent, if subtle, warning signals produced by one’s 
own censurable thoughts and actions (e.g., Mellon, 2009; 2013). 
When the threat of punishment fails to reduce the probability of offensive behavior, as it 
often does, everyone pays a penalty. Conformity or compliance is never the only way to 
terminate unpleasant warnings or demands (e.g., Skinner, 1971; Sidman, 1989) and many 
alternative forms of escape from threat prove to be more problematic than the original 
transgressions. Most obvious among them are the myriad forms of counter-threat and 
counter-attack, activities that expose both parties to elevated risk of harm or displeasure; 
but sullen contempt, pitiable displays of inadequacy or victimhood, anarchy, nihilism, self-
harm or attempted suicide, abuse of drink, psychoactive drugs, and food—and lately, with-
drawal into cyberspace—are also among the common forms of pernicious escape occa-
sioned by everyday aversive social control. 
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Aversive social control of behavior is derailed by anonymity 
Yet another unloved offspring of oppressive behavior control practices is deceptive or cryp-
tic misconduct. Threats of punishment for undesirable activity can be terminated by acts 
that render the activity itself unobservable. Lying about personal responsibility, for example, 
is a form of escape from threat of social punishment that is effective only when the identity 
of the author of an offence cannot be detected by the aggrieved party. In a system of con-
trol based upon threat of transition to reduced circumstances, anonymity is tantamount to 
immunity from social punishment, a precious commodity created by aversive control prac-
tices themselves and, ironically, proving itself to be a source evolution of antisocial activity. 
For example, in the hope of reducing street crime, a community might sacrifice their own 
privacy and install security cameras, but the well-prepared lawbreaker can hack the system 
by wearing anti-surveillance clothing, which in turn has led police officers to selectively in-
terrogate young men who wear hoodies, and even penalize their public donning, sparking 
protests of civil rights violations (e.g., Patterson, 2016)—and so on.  
The effects of even partial social camouflage on the probability of occurrence of punishable 
behavior is clearly visible in the comments section of a platform like Youtube, where com-
menters are identified only by a username of their own choosing. In this environment, eval-
uations about performances, opinions, group membership, physical appearance and the like 
are far more nasty and cruel than those typically encountered in eponymous interactions, in 
which such unkind behavior tends to have powerful repercussions. Surveys of users of such 
platforms have indicated that as many as one in four admit to have engaged in intensely 
aversive commentary (e.g., March & Marrington, 2019). With increasing frequency of use, 
words and phrases that once elicited shock and evoked attention become ineffective or 
even boring, such that the typed productions of persons producing “likes” for “restoring jus-
tice” by hurting themselves and others inevitably become more and more impressively hurt-
ful. We are each unkind in accordance with the history of effects of our unkind acts in a giv-
en context, and anonymity is a context in which many long-standing sanctions against inci-
vility are lifted. 
Of course not all usernames are equally anonymous or plausibly deniable, and no one who is 
impressed by the low-tech hacking of a Guccifer could believe in truly incognito internet 
trolling or bullying, but it is all the more disheartening to see what has happened to public 
discourse by simply rendering the discovery of the authors of verbal assault inconvenient. It 
is disheartening in its suggestion that in contexts in which rational dialogue of civil tone is 
observed, it is not sustained so much by its positive virtues as by its role in averting threats 
of retaliation for rudeness. That suggestion well and truly shakes our confidence in the via-
bility of Homo Virtualis in the epoch of advanced digital encryptology now upon us. 
 
The struggle for freedom and the portent of a darker web 
As information and economic scientists writing in this issue and in the global forum attest, 
efforts to generate a convenient, permanent, impenetrable, incorruptible and sustainable 
digital monetary systems have given rise to distributed encryption technologies that can be 
utilized to mightily challenge the identification of parties engaged in monetary transactions 
and other forms of social exchange that are conventionally met with censure (e.g., Whyte, 
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2019). These include not only crimes such as money laundering, child abuse, human traffick-
ing and the funding of terrorist activities (e.g., Foley et al., 2018; Whyte, 2019), but also legal 
activities that are met with disapproval and derision when observed by many people, such 
as groups encouraging hate speech, self-harm and nihilistic or suicidal ideation in young 
people (e.g., Daine et al., 2013).  
In his analysis of the history and determinants of the social struggle for freedom, B. F. Skin-
ner (1971) noted that this enduring fight of and for humanity specifically concerns the ter-
mination of aversive control—of forced choice, compelled conduct, and the policing of self 
that is requisite to escape the threat of others. Nobody protests when their actions occasion 
accommodation, respect, mutual benefit and pleasure from others, though such conse-
quences of our acts obviously tend to increase the probability of occurrence of similar activi-
ty on subsequent occasions; operant behavior just works that way. No, in our personal as in 
our collective struggles, we specifically yearn for freedom from unnecessary and painful or 
unwanted social imposition. With respect to our online activity, that is the condition cur-
rently promised by emerging encryption technology. It comes with a catch.  
To remain free, Homo Virtualis must continue to behave with humanity in the absence of 
any threat of detection—in the perfect conditions for extracting brutish satisfaction at other 
peoples’ expense. Otherwise, the threat of punishment will not only return, it will likely be 
redoubled. Decentralized cryptocurrencies have already been banned in a number of coun-
tries, principally in states known to restrict and surveil their citizens’ activities on the inter-
net. That can happen anywhere if adequately provoked. It may be accompanied by exposure 
to propaganda in which the viewer is initially charmed by the protagonist, who falls on very 
hard times when lured into encryption violation. Thus the watchful citizen is taught to rec-
ognize and terminate his or her own exposure to environments that are temptingly free of 
the threat of punishment. The virtualis species of hominid will thus either fall victim to the 
intrapersonal oppression of its own conduct, reduced to a pallid encryptophobe, or it will go 
rogue in a struggle to restore freedom in cyberspace, which is no picnic either. 
Should the termination of the threat of punishment for online activity fail to occasion be-
havior characterized by enlightened self-interest—should we fail the test of newfound free-
dom—the size and scope of the ensuing crackdown on cryptology will depend upon the new 
technology’s sustained resistance to cracking. Many in the cyber community have high 
hopes about the refuge potential of blockchain technology, and if it is not the promised 
cloak of invisibility, superior blurring of identity may suffice to occasion dramatic change in 
online activity. With surveillance derailed and misdeed in the ascendant, the only way for 
society to maintain the effectiveness a debilitated aversive control is to increase the pain-
fulness of punishment and the potency of its threat (read: “Winter is coming”). 
One cannot but think that, at present, the viability of Homo Virtualis as Homo sapiens truly 
free from social sanctions is suspect. There is, however, hope that a truly private internet 
will serve as a sort of laboratory for how things might be arranged such that human beings 
tend to behave in accord with the public good absent the threat of punishment for misdeed. 
Today and whenever cryptology renders pernicious behavior undetectable, as an alternative 
to more extreme sanctions, we might think how we might come to live well, online and off, 
without fear of retribution for error or misconduct. A natural science of behavior can help 
with that (e.g., Skinner, 1953; Sidman, 1989; Μέλλον, 2013). 
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How a darker web might expedite behavioral enlightenment 
How do we balance the individual’s right to privacy and freedom from punishment with the 
necessity of limiting the occurrence of malice and malfeasance? The positive reinforcement 
of behavior incompatible with problematic activity is an attractively potent alternative. Over 
time, the probability of occurrence of any given form of antisocial behavior is reduced 
whenever the consequence of an incompatible prosocial behavior is transition to a better 
circumstance. That is true whether the reinforcing transition is the termination of a threat 
(negative reinforcement) or the production of a welcomed condition (positive reinforce-
ment). This is the difference between having to do something and wanting to do it—
between fear of displeasure if not performed vs. anticipation of pleasure when performed. 
If we can no longer detect the activity of a person who behaves badly in a context of virtual 
anonymity, perhaps we will finally get around to a more effective intervention strategy than 
our bronze-age policy of catch, cudgel and cage. One of the splendid features of positively 
reinforcing prosocial behavior is that the images, words and other events produced by our 
own behavior when we solve problems rationally and justly acquire positive value or rein-
forcing potency, such that we enjoy doing the right thing for ourselves and our community 
even when no one is watching. We need no intimidating surveillance to make us keep doing 
what we want to do—the trick is to establish the positive reinforcing potency of the events 
produced by behaviors that serve the public good, such as by celebrating the correspond-
ence of explanation and evidence, and the consideration of the effects of our behavior on 
those around us, both immediately and with the pass of time. These and other unequivocal-
ly prosocial characteristics of behavior are useful to others, who may well show their appre-
ciation, further strengthening and refining them.  
By establishing the positive reinforcing potency of doing the right thing—and of systemati-
cally examining why we judge that thing it to be right—we might protect the common good 
without menace and supervision. It may be too late to reform the unsupervised misbehavior 
of some of us who never learned to enjoy and value the welfare of those around us—and 
every bad action will increase the probability of a general crackdown on private interac-
tion—but most us who have never before lived in freedom from punishment are still gov-
erned by pain of conscious trained in extended aversive surveillance, and we tend to dis-
trust promises of anonymity too much to risk malfeasance. Upcoming generations will know 
less of this and will be increasingly unable to depend upon social censure and its threat to 
curb their malicious tendencies. To thrive in this brave new world of anonymity they must 
well and truly come to behave beauteously even when not forced to do so, because in cy-
berspace at least, they might never be forced to do so. Otherwise, we can only expect the 
worst from a darker corner of cyberspace where, for the moment, our offending sister and 
brother humans choose to exercise the dubious freedom afforded to a fugitive from social 
punishment. 
 
True anonymity also reduces threats posed by positive prosocial intervention 
To recap, positively reinforcing prosocial behavior reduces the frequency of occurrence of 
antisocial behavior without threat of pain and anxious vigilance. A derailing of the aversive 
control of behavior by advanced cryptography might thus compel us to rethink how we ar-
range circumstances to reduce the frequency of occurrence of problematic behavior. Be-
yond necessitating that we step beyond brutal social conventions to limit problematic activi-
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ty rendered undetectable, a truly private electronic interaction platform could itself con-
tribute significantly to the dissemination of positive reinforcement-based social interven-
tions.  
People who fantasize and engage in widely censured activities such as sexual harassment 
and assault, child abuse, self-abuse, and hatefulness to groups are naturally reticent to dis-
close their behavior to anyone not known to share their proclivities. As a result, they speak 
of their problematic behavior principally to persons who are likely to encourage it. The ac-
ceptance of widely hated personal qualities that social offenders find in marginalized and 
aggrieved group interaction readily generates loyalty to the clandestine clan, further reduc-
ing the probability that the individual will betray their problematic behavior to someone 
who can help to change its course. But the ready availability of a truly anonymous channel 
of human interaction will insulate the exploration and discussion of the nature and determi-
nants of pernicious activity from the censure of both the in-group and the general popula-
tion, removing a fundamental barrier to the efforts of specialists in problematic behavior to 
help the person to get their life back on track.  
In our primitive blood lust to avenge wrongdoing, we often fail to recognize that the antiso-
cial behavior that damages, disappoints or revolts us is deeply rooted in the individual’s his-
tory of interaction with the world, and that the future course of a harmful action tendency 
depends also upon how we treat the person’s behavior now. In bitter irony, the cruel and 
hurtful behavior that we are so anxious to punish in others is often itself a product of aver-
sive control. Helping a person to understand how, in the course of their life, the effects of 
activities that harm others acquired positive value can reduce their reinforcing potency. 
Likewise, helping a person to gain what is needed from others in a manner that is mutually 
advantageous establishes the positive value of events produced by socially responsible be-
havior—by acts physically incompatible with misdeed. Helping, say, a pederast to under-
stand how such dreadful behavior is shaped in events of living, and to discover the irresisti-
ble joy of mutually fulfilling sexual activity in the context of an intimate relation with an in-
tellectual and experiential peer, cannot guarantee the eradication of his malfeasance, but it 
remains our best chance—and perhaps soon our only chance—to produce the kind of be-
havior that characterizes enlightened self-interest in a social space radically freed of hostile 
imposition. The very real threat of encryption technology might thus be transformed into an 
opportunity for the erosion of threat of punishment itself as our go-to policy for limiting 
malfeasance. Bonus fortuna, Homo Virtualis! 
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